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An integrated representation of large-scale space, or cognitive map, called 
PLAN, is presented that attempts to address a broader spectrum of issues than 
has been previously attempted in a single model. Rather than examining woy- 
finding OS ct process separate from the rest of cognition, one of the fundamental 
goals of this work is to examine how the wayfinding process is integrated into 
general cognition. One result of this approach is that the model is “heads-up,” or 
scene-based, because it takes advantage of the properties of the human visual 
system and, particularly, the visual system’s split into two pathways. The em- 
phasis on the human location or “where” system is new to cognitive mapping and 
is part of an attempt to synthesize prototype theory, associative networks and 
location together in a connectionist system. Not all of PLAN is new, however. 
Many of its parts have anologues in one or another preexisting theory. What 
makes PLAN unique is integrating the various components into a coherent whole, 
and the capacity of this resulting system to speak to o wide range of constraints. 
Our approach emphasizes adaptiveness: thus, our focus on such issues as ease of 
use and efficiency of learning. The result is a model that has a stronger relation- 
ship both to the environment, and to the ways thot humans interact with it, com- 
pared with previous models. The resulting model is examined in some detail and 
compared to other systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
Wayfinding is an important and complex task. The specialized structures 
that humans use for this task are called cognitive maps (Golledge, 1987). 
Although cognitive maps are useful for a wide variety of reasons (Kaplan & 
Kaplan, 1989), their fundamental purpose is wayfinding. A cognitive map 
serves two functions with regard to wayfinding: representing environments, 
Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to Eric Chown, Department of 
Computer Science, Dearborn Hall, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 9733 1. 
1 
2 CHOWN, KAPLAN, AND KORTENKAMP 
and the corresponding ability to use the representations to move from place 
to place within the mapped environments. This article presents a reprebenta- 
tional theory of human cognitive mapping that addresses a wider spectrum 
of way~nding issues than most other theories in the literature. Part of what 
makes this work unique in the cognitive mapping literature is that it draws 
on solutions from other domains of cognitive science and synthesizes them 
in a new way. In particular what stands out in PLAN (Prototypes, Location 
and Associative Networks) is an account of the impact that the capabilities 
of the human visual system, and in particular its two subsystems (the what 
and where systems), have on the kinds of cognitive maps that people 
ultimately develop. 
Human wayfinding can be broken down into four component problems: 
landmark identification, path selection, direction selection, and creating 
abstract environmental overviews. Solutions to the first three of these prob- 
lems are essential to human wayfinding. The fourth problem, achieving 
environmental abstraction, is a means of substantially increasing efficiency 
and functionality. Although the four problems are individually separable, a 
unified solution requires an integrating framework to mesh them together. 
Landmark identification is the most basic component of wayfind- 
ing. Landmarks are environmental place markers vital in determining 
orientation and current location. The landmark identification prob- 
lem in wayfinding is to separate out distinctive objects in the environ- 
ment, called landmarks, which can later be used in route planning and 
can be recognized while traversing the chosen route. 
Path selection involves choosing a route to the goal. In this case a 
path is not a direction, but is more algorithmic, for example, a series 
of places that will lead to the goal. In many models of cognitive map- 
pings, paths are conceptualized as sequences of landmarks. TO follow 
a path one goes from landmark to landmark in the sequence; at each 
landmark in the path it will be necessary to select the next landmark in 
the sequence. 
Direction selection involves choosing a direction in which to travel. 
If the goal is in sight, for example, a reasonable direction to pick 
would be towards the goal. For goals that are not in sight the direction 
selection problem is of course more difficult; beyond the fact that the 
goal cannot be seen, sometimes a journey will require a series of turns 
and shifts in direction. Thus, direction selection at the starting point is 
rarely sufficient to guide an entire route. 
Abstract environmental overviews are a further generalization of 
the route concept. If one were to travel extensively in a particular 
environment, it would be useful to have a coherent overview of the 
entire environment. Rather than dealing with routes individually, such 
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a structure would allow them to be extracted from a common abstrac- 
tion. In addition, this overview would make large-scale reasoning 
about the environmental simpler. However, although these overviews 
do serve to increase the efficiency of wayfinding, they are not strictly 
necessary. Thus, we will include a discussion of wayfinding without 
such capabilities. 
Each of these four subproblems has a different character and conse- 
quently is likely to require a different solution. The landmark identification 
problem primarily concerns the object recognition system. The path selection 
problem is cognitive, often requiring the selection of one path among a 
number of alternatives. The direction selection problem, while generally 
visual, is more locational than the landmark identification problem. Finally, 
the problem of creating an abstract environmental overview requires a hier- 
archical synthesis of each of the other three solutions. Although we are tak- 
ing a modular approach, it need not be the case that the subsystems are 
completely separated; for example, knowing what to expect next on a path 
may be a useful bit of information when identifying a landmark. Therefore, 
although we will discuss each problem separately, throughout the article we 
will be careful to note how the different parts interact in the overall theory. 
The solutions offered by PLAN to each of these problems are not neces- 
sarily new. Indeed, this model builds upon our own previous work, and that 
of the connectionist oriented SESAME’ group. In particular, PLAN repre- 
sents a synthesis of prior work on associative networks (Kaplan, 1973; 
Levenick, 1991), on prlstotypes (Kaplan, Sonntag, & Chown, I991), and on 
spatial or locational visual processing (Lesperance, 1990). Thus, what is 
new is the attempt to construct a coherent synthesis of several previously 
divergent lines of research. The complementarity of these various com- 
ponents has, in fact, exceeded our expectations. The resulting system has a 
number of interesting properties, among them economy, simplicity, and 
error tolerance. 
This article begins by laying out the key constraints that have driven the 
PLAN model. We take for granted that PLAN is a connectionist model; 
because the portions of our previous work incorporated in PLAN are all 
connectionist, this constraint is implicit. (Readers interested in the SESAME 
approach to connectionist modeling can refer to Kaplan, Weaver, and 
French (1990) and Kaplan et al. (1991).) The remaining constraints can be 
divided into three catagories: (1) constraints deriving from the fact that cog- 
nitive maps were developed in an evolutionary context; (2) physiological 
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constraints, particularly pertaining to the brain structure associated with 
processing spatial information; and (3) what we will call developmental con- 
straints, but which will also subsume general psychological constraints 
derived from studies of human behavior. In the third section of the article 
we will present the PLAN model. Although we will compare specific parts 
of PLAN to pieces of other models along the way, we save extended com- 
parisons until after the entire model has been presented. The fourth section, 
therefore, will center around a more general discussion of PLAN and how it 
compares to, and differs from, other theories in the literature. 
CONSTRAINTS 
There is an indefinitely large body of material that might be considered at 
least somewhat pertinent to a theory of human cognitive mapping. It is not 
our intention to provide a comprehensive analysis of all possible con- 
straints. Rather, our focus is on key themes, on constraints that suggest 
general principles under which such a model should operate. 
Evolutionary Constraints 
Evolutionary constraints concern the incremental and robust development 
of cognitive maps. It is unlikely that structures as complex as cognitive maps 
could have developed all at once; rather, they are likely to have developed 
one piece at a time, each piece contributing in some positive way to the 
overall functionality of the map. This has a wide range of implications for 
the types of structures that might develop. Some of these implications will 
be addressed as they arise throughout the course of the article, but a few are 
sufficiently central to introduce at the outset: These are simplicity, consis- 
tency, and economy. 
Simplicity of structure is important for a number of reasons. First, sim- 
ple structures are less likely to break down. The fewer interactions among 
components, the smaller the chance of error. Second, simple structures are 
more plausible from an evolutionary standpoint. Complex structures may 
require parallel development of a number of separate pieces. However, each 
piece of the structure must be useful in its own right or it would not develop 
in the first place. 
Evolution is essentially a conservative process (Clark, 1989). In terms of 
the brain, this means that mechanisms and structures that have proven use- 
ful in one domain are likely to be used in other domains when possible; 
change comes out of necessity., Like simplicity, consistency will tend to bring 
reliability, an essential ingredient for evolutionary success. The consistency 
principle mandates that similar mechanisms and structures will be used in a 
wide range of domains. The brain is very unlikely to use vastly different 
representational structures according to the needs of a particular task; 
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rather, it is likely to have developed general-purpose structures that are 
widely adaptable. 
The economy constraint is closely related to what Clark (1989) called the 
“007 principle. ” This principle gets its name from the fictional character 
James Bond who, as a spy, was only given information on a “need to know” 
basis. The principle states that creatures will neither store nor process infor- 
mation in costly ways when they can use the structure of the environment 
and their operations upon it as a convenient stand-in for the information- 
processing operations concerned. For example, rather than computing and 
storing the exact coordinates of some object, a more economical solution 
might be simply to store the fact that it is next to a well-known landmark, 
Storing and processing information comes with a cost; if creature A can get 
away with less storage and processing than creature B, then it has a survival 
advantage in the long run. 
These principles are fairly basic, but it is easy to lose sight of them when 
examining one particular piece of the larger cognitive mapping puzzle. 
Perhaps this is because such principles make more sense in the context of 
the whole cognitive map than when studying the individual pieces. These 
constraints are useful because they limit the space of possible forms that 
cognitive maps may take and provide a framework by which unified models 
can be judged. 
Physiological Constraints 
For sighted humans, spatial information characteristically comes from the 
visual system because it directly affords the richest source of spatial rela- 
tionships. Directional, or locational, information, however, is distinct from 
the kinds of information useful for recognizing objects. Indeed, it has been 
found that there are two separate subsystems within the visual system, one 
for recognizing objects and one for discerning the spatial locations of objects 
(Otto, Grandguillaume, Boutkhill, Burnad, & Guigan, 1992; Ungerleider 
& Mishkin, 1982). These systems are often called the what and where 
systems or the contour and location systems (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989; 
Lesperance, 1990; Rueckl, Cave, & Kosslyn, 1988). 
These two systems provide humans with two different types of informa- 
tion even though most people are unaware that such distinctions are being 
made. One system identifies objects and the other determines where things 
are in space. There is clearly a strong correspondence between these two 
systems and what we have called the landmark identification problem and 
the direction selection problem. The landmark identification problem re- 
quires object recognition, whereas the direction selection problem requires 
knowing where those landmarks exist in space relative to each other and to 
the observer. 
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It is possible to imagine that cognitive maps could exist without one or 
the other system. For example, a cognitive map without locational capabili- 
ties might simply consist of a network of landmarks. Navigation in such a 
system would involve moving to a landmark, looking around for the next 
landmark, and repeating this process until the goal has been reached. 
Navigating with a cognitive map based upon the locational system, on the 
other hand, would involve a different mode of operation more akin to what 
is often described as having a good sense of direction. In such a mode one 
knows where one is relative to one’s goal and individual landmarks along 
the way are not so important. In fact, we will argue that humans are capable 
of functioning either way, where one mode of functioning relies heavily 
upon recognition of nearby objects and the other mode relies more on 
knowing the relative locations of objects, even when they may be widely 
separated in space. 
A body of research that is closely related to the work on the two visual 
systems centers around the role of the hippocampus in spatial processing. 
One physiological theory of cognitive mapping even posits that the function 
of cognitive maps takes place almost exclusively within the hippocampus 
(O’Keefe, 1989; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). Most of the evidence concerns the 
relationship between firing rates of neurons within the hippocampus as 
modulated by different locations and orientations within a location. Such 
studies suggest that the hippocampus is used to store and process scenes. In 
particular, O’Keefe speculated that different scenes are stored and can be 
indexed by the head orientation of the organism as well as its physical loca- 
tion and orientation. He postulated that there are default-stored representa- 
tions for a particular location and went on to describe how stored scenes 
might be matched against visual input. More recent evidence presented by 
Squire (1992) suggests that the hippocampus is more of an interface between 
stored spatial memory structures and the currently perceived environment. 
Such an arrangement is not at odds with O’Keefe’s findings and suggests 
that his theory of how the hippocampus resolves petceived versus stored 
scenes may be sound. However, Squire’s evidence also shows that there is a 
great deal more to spatial functioning than can be accounted for in the hip- 
pocampus alone, as evidenced by how organisms with damage to their hip- 
pocampus are able to function. Nevertheless, the hippocampal data, 
especially in conjunction with other data on the physiology of the visual 
systems, provides important insights into the nature of the kinds of spatial 
structures that are contained in cognitive maps. 
A significant portion of PLAN is based upon this type of Iocational in- 
formation, combining what is known about the where part of the visual 
system with the evidence on how the hippocampus functions to provide the 
basis of a system that extracts basic spatial relationships from scenes and 
can store and retrieve such scenes based upon using cues such as the orienta- 
tion of the eyes, head, and body. 
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Developmental Theories 
If there is one area of research within the field of cognitive mapping that is 
relatively free of disagreement, it is the work on the developmental sequence 
of cognitive maps. The aim of this research is essentially to provide func- 
tional descriptions of the stages in which children’s cognitive maps develop. 
There is also evidence that cognitive maps in adults show these same stages 
in new environments (Golledge, 1987). The characterization of the develop- 
mental approach that we will present in the following sections is a distilla- 
tion of the theories of Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967), Siegel and White 
(1975) and Shemyakin (1962). Although all three lines of work vary some- 
what in terminology and in exact separation of stages, they are in general 
agreement. One goal of this article is to describe the mechanisms responsi- 
ble for the developmental sequence, an area that Bates and Elman (1992) 
considered to be poorly developed in most cognitive theories. 
Landmarks 
The first stage of development could be called the object, or landmark, 
level. As we shall see, this is one area that computational models of cogni- 
tive maps have tended to gloss over and it is also the case that developmen- 
tal theories spend little time on the nature of landmarks. The developmental 
theorists stress the differentiability of landmarks, but offer little theoretical 
underpinning as to what constitutes one. For such theorists the important 
point is that children must learn the objects in the world before they can 
start putting the objects together in a structured way to form a representa- 
tion of the world. 
As research on computer vision has shown, separating out objects from 
their environment and recognizing them is far from a simple task. Because 
this task is so complex and because it is so intimately linked to the context in 
which we see objects, we will argue that landmarks must be treated as struc- 
tures far more complex than mere symbols to be plugged into a higher level 
representation. As the developmental theorists do not delve into such issues, 
we will turn instead to the psychological literature, which has examined the 
object recognition problem in considerable detail; our discussion of land- 
marks will center around the concept of prototypes, a representation that 
has been proposed for how humans store objects. 
Route Maps 
The second developmental stage is usually called the route map stage. At 
this stage the cognitive map appears to consist of a large collection of 
routes. Shemyakin (1962) provided one of the best descriptions of this phe- 
nomenon when he described how children draw pictures of their neighbor- 
hoods. Rather than drawing the neighborhood from a global perspective, 
children draw it as though they were imagining walking around it, even 
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turning the paper as they turn in their routes. Quite simply, children’s cog- 
nitive maps closely resemble their experience at this stage. Their experience 
consists of walking various routes around their neighborhood, and their 
cognitive maps reflects it. At this stage there is very little conception of the 
neighborhood as a whole entity. Shemyakin’s description is striking because 
it is so visually and, in particular, locationally oriented: Children turn the 
paper to correspond with their mental image of what is in front of them. 
Piaget, perhaps because he was not looking at navigation, but rather 
spatial development as a whole, subdivided this stage (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1967). The route map stage covers the egocentric and preoperational phases 
of Piaget’s developmental sequence. For Piaget, the child first begins to 
relate objects to self and later begins to see relationships between objects 
beginning with topological relationships. This viewpoint is completely con- 
sistent with the route map hypothesis. At the route map stage, the informa- 
tion is assimilated directly, reflecting the child’s experience rather than 
an abstract data structure. It is the environment that shapes the representa- 
tion rather than the representation shaping the perception of the environ- 
ment. This reliance upon direct experience could be called egocentric. As 
children move through an environment, the experiential information they 
receive will be of a topological character. A child need not even move through 
an environment to receive topological information; it is only necessary to 
move the eyes. Things that are close together will be experienced close 
together. The representation reflects the environment by capturing the 
experience of it. 
The differences between Piaget’s (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967) characteriza- 
tion of routes and Shemyakin’s (1962) harken back to our earlier discussion 
of two possible types of functioning within a cognitive map: one that relies 
upon recognizing nearby objects and one that consists of knowing more 
about the relationships of objects. Piaget’s characterization suggests a topo- 
logically organized collection of landmarks. A journey using such a struc- 
ture could be characterized as going from landmark to landmark. Indeed, 
as we shall see later in this article, such a representation forms the basis for 
a number of models of cognitive maps. Shemyakin’s description is also 
essentially egocentric, but there are subtle, yet telling, differences. As the 
children describe their neighborhoods they turn their paper as they would 
turn if they were walking a route. Such a knowledge structure is not topo- 
logical, but instead could be characterized as directional. A route in such a 
structure also consists of going from place to place, but the places no longer 
necessarily correspond to landmarks, but instead correspond to the actual 
locations that the children move through in their journeys, particularly 
those places where a change in direction is necessary. 
Tieing the evolutionary, physiological, and developmental arguments 
together, we are suggesting that there are parallel structures in cognitive 
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maps at this stage. The first structures are like Piaget’s (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1967) characterization, topological representations of landmarks. Such 
structures are very simple, and therefore quick, to learn. Such structures 
also provide a useful means of planning journeys with a relatively minimal 
amount of information. At the same time a more directional structure is 
being developed. Because it requires more information, such as information 
about the relative locations of landmarks, it is slower to develop. However, 
because it contains this extra information, in the long run it is potentially 
more useful. The complementarity of such a system is useful from an evolu- 
tionary perspective because the organism with both structures would not 
need to rely on either one, and provides a kind of graceful degradation in 
case there is damage to one or the other system. Such a system can also ac- 
count for a great many individual differences in learning and functioning in 
environments as different people will acquire the two structures at different 
speeds and might rely upon one or the other to varying degrees. We will 
discuss these two forms of route maps, which we will call topological and 
locational, in much greater depth when we present the details of PLAN 
later. 
Survey Maps 
The next stage of cognitive map development, the survey map, is often ig- 
nored by computational models of cognitive maps. One tendency of existing 
models is to conceptualize survey maps as being essentially like cartographic 
maps. In other words, it is assumed that they capture very precise Euclidian 
spatial information. Indeed, this is the direction that much of the work in 
robotics has taken as well. There are, however, little or no data to support 
this notion in people. 
The transition from route maps to survey maps is marked by two impor- 
tant steps. First, an objective frame of reference appears to be developed. 
To continue with Shemyakin’s (1962) example, children at this stage no 
longer need to turn the paper as they draw the neighborhood. Rather, they 
sketch whole sections at a time, as if they were able to see them, instead of 
relying on sequences. It appears, therefore, that they are no longer re- 
creating specific experiences, but are now integrating experiences to form a 
coherent whole. 
Of course if route maps truly are represented as networks, they already 
reflect some integration across experiences. However, route maps afford 
only partial spatial information at a local level. In particular, what route 
maps lack are easily recoverable relationships between distant objects. The 
second significant step beyond route maps that survey maps take is the ability 
to determine spatial relationships of objects that are not close in space. The 
fundamental difference between route maps and survey maps is that in one 
case the information is local and in the other case it is global. However, as 
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Shemyakin’s (1962) example shows, survey maps may be fundamentally 
visual and image-like just as the route map structures appeared to be. In 
returning to the theme that there are two kinds of functionality within 
cognitive maps, what this suggests is that survey maps are large-scale direc- 
tional maps that provide a visual overview of a space that is normally too 
large to be seen all at once (except from an elevated perspective). An essen- 
tial principle of PLAN will be that many of the structures within a cognitive 
map, including the survey map representations, will be visual in nature and 
that processing with such structures will be closely akin to seeing the environ- 
ment in one’s head. 
However, although such structures would capture spatial relationships 
between distant objects, they do not seem to be objective frames of refer- 
ence, which is supposedly one of the crucial developments in the survey 
map. Indeed, our claim is that survey maps, rather than being objective, are 
anchored at a particular perspective. However, as we shall see in the discus- 
sion of our own version of survey maps, this is not a problem when the per- 
spective at which the maps are anchored is at the edge of the environment. 
In such cases everything within the environment can be “seen” and the spa- 
tial relationships between any arbitrary objects can be determined because 
everything is in front of the observer. It will also generally be the case that 
multiple survey maps can be created for a single environment making it pos- 
sible to switch to the viewpoint most appropriate to a given task. 
Summary 
The combination of the evolutionary, physiological, and developmental 
constraints suggests a basic structure and sequence of development for 
cognitive maps. This structure starts out with landmarks, distinct objects in 
the environment. The first stage of mapping consists of learning a topologi- 
cal structure built out of landmarks through experience. Use of such a map 
would then consist of extracting a sequence of landmarks from one’s start- 
ing point to one’s goal. As experience within the environment grows, an 
additional type of route map also comes to be. Rather than consisting of a 
sequence of landmarks, this structure consists of a sequence of places that 
one has experienced. Corresponding to each of these places, a directional 
structure is stored that codes relative directions of landmarks, With such a 
structure in place, the role of the landmark goes from destination to 
marker. That is to say that a trip is no longer conceptualized as a series of 
landmarks, but instead it is a series of places, and landmarks are useful in 
keeping track of where one is. However, even at this stage the information 
used is local: what can be perceived from where one is standing. Once 
survey maps are developed, however, then global information is available 
for wayfinding. With a survey map one can “see” the direction one needs to 
go to reach one’s goal even when it is far away. 
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Such a system is grounded in the evolutionary principles that we have set 
forth. Each new stage builds upon the functionality of the previous stage 
and even the early stages provide the organism with the ability to do useful 
wayfinding. The two types of routes developed provide the system with 
useful complementarity and redundancy helping to make it robust. On the 
physiological side, these two types of routes reflect the two types of process- 
ing done in the visual system. The what system relies only upon the identifi- 
cation of objects; location is irrelevant. The where system, on the other 
hand, codes the relative location of objects. Because there is more informa- 
tion and more processing involved in determining the relationships of objects, 
the process of learning such structures is necessarily slower than the simple 
process of building a topological structure out of landmarks. With enough 
experience a survey map can be constructed, providing additional function- 
ality and, we will argue, building upon the structures already in place. 
In the next section we will describe PLAN in detail. The structure of our 
description is based upon the developmental sequence already described: 
landmarks, routes (both topological and locational) and then survey maps. 
We have already outlined the general constraints that PLAN should meet. It 
should bring together three distinct pieces: the developmental and psycho- 
logical literatures, the physiology of the visual system, and a connectionist 
framework. Once we have described the system in detail we will examine 




Landmarks function as a kind of environmental index. Recognizing nearby 
landmarks is enough to tell one where one is in a familiar environment. 
Consequently, the fundamental property of landmarks is that they must be 
uniquely identifiable. Within the cognitive mapping literature, this is almost 
the only property of landmarks that seems to matter. This is mainly due to 
the fact that unique identification is a perceptual issue and therefore, appar- 
ently, out of the domain of the more high-level issues that cognitive map 
research typically focuses on. However, this does not mean that there is not 
an extensive literature on landmarks. On the contrary, it is our position that 
landmarks form a special case of widely studied issues in cognitive science: 
object recognition and categorization. 
Landmark recognition cannot be treated as a separate issue from object 
recognition. If anything, landmark recognition is more difficult than object 
recognition because there is less room for generalization. For example, it is 
often good enough to recognize that the creature on the hill is a dog, but a 
landmark must be a particular instance, such as the tree with the big branches 
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close to the ground on one side. Having separate object and landmark sys- 
tems would require extra bookkeeping and processing. It would violate our 
economy principle if an object in one context could be a landmark in 
another. Such a separation also suggests that there is some a priori way of 
distinguishing between an object and a landmark, which cannot be possible 
because every object is a potential landmark. Because there is no a priori 
way to tell the difference between an object and a landmark, there is no 
reason to have separate representation system. Such an arrangement would 
be a direct violation of Clarke’s (1989) 007 principle_ It simplifies matters 
considerabiy to have one representation that is useful in both contexts. 
The landmark identification probfem, therefore, is in reality a special 
case of the object recognition problem. The object recognition problem is 
not quite the same as taking a given visual input and deciding what it con- 
tains, because it assumes that a pertinent object has already been extracted 
from the visual field, a major piece of processing in itself. Given that the 
object has been extracted, the object recognition problem becomes one of 
categorization; the problem is to determine if a given input corresponds to 
any known categories. In the case of a cognitive map the categories are the 
individual landmarks, and the problem when looking at an object is to 
determine if the object corresponds to any known l~dmarks. 
Treating landmarks as categorical represents something of a departure 
from standard thinking. On the face of it, a landmark would seem to be a 
single, unique object, not a category. From the point of view of the sensory 
input an organism wouid receive, however, any object can give rise to a 
multitude of stimulus configurations. Seen from different distances and at 
different viewing angles, under varying lighting conditions, and even 
sometimes partially obscured by other objects, a landmark (like any other 
object) presents a challenge to traditional theories of pattern recognition. 
The variety of stimulus configurations must somehow be integrated into a 
whole so they can be recognized as functionally the same thing. Such a pro- 
cess of identifying a variety of different patterns as serving as an equivalence 
class with respect to a common label or referent is what is usually referred to 
as categorization. 
In summary, the representations that will be used in the identification of 
landmarks are exactly those used for categorization. The representation of 
landmarks are constrained in the same ways as the representation of any 
other categories. 
Prototypes 
Prototype theory was developed to address the constraints that a categori- 
zation scheme must meet (Posner & Keele, 1968; Rosch, 1978). Prototypes 
are usually thought of as being the typical example of a category; the proto- 
PROTOTYPES, LOCATION, AND ASSOCIATIVE NETWORKS (PLAN) 13 
typic dog, for example, would have four legs, a tail, and so on. Prototypes 
are generalizations derived from a range of experience. In such a generaliza- 
tion the features that occur most often come to represent the prototype, 
whereas features that occur less often are weaker, giving the prototype a sta- 
tistical nature, reflecting experience. 
Just because prototypes are generalizations does not mean that individual 
objects are not represented as prototypes. Indeed, we may experience an in- 
dividual dog in a wide variety of contexts and see it under varying condi- 
tions. In the case of a landmark we can experience it from different angles, 
distances, orientations, lighting conditions, and the like. An individual 
representation will be the prototype of a large number of experiences, those 
features which best represent the landmark forming the core of its represen- 
tation. So, for example, a building might have a black door on one side, but 
if that door is not typically seen when looking at the building, then it will 
only weakly be a part of the prototype. On the other hand, if the door is on 
the side of the building that is most frequently seen it will be a very impor- 
tant part of the prototype and the building will probably typically be 
thought of from that orientation. 
Prototypes are organized in hierarchies where the levels range from the 
specific to the abstract. At the bottom of a hierarchy will be individual ex- 
amples with each successively higher level bringing a corresponding increase 
in the generality of what is being represented. For example, individual trees 
will be at the bottom of a hierarchy, but one level up might have different 
types of trees such as oak or maple, another level could contain classes such 
as conifer and deciduous, and another level could contain the general 
category of trees. 
Prototype theory has been attacked, in part, due to some confusion 
resulting from multiple uses of the term (Lakoff, 1987), and to the fact that 
it is statistically based. Keil and Batterman (1984), however, have shown 
that young children develop statistical categories before shifting to more 
theoretical ones. This suggests that prototypes may serve as the basic cate- 
gory structure with theoretical categories emerging from contextual issues. 
With regard to landmarks, nothing beyond a statistical representation is 
likely to be necessary because there is no generalization of landmarks. All of 
the variation is within a landmark, not across landmarks. Whereas “un- 
usual buildings” may serve as a general class of landmarks, the modifier 
“unusual” denotes that this is a category in which what the individual 
members have in common is that they are different. After all, the character- 
istic feature of landmarks is that they must be distinctive. For this reason 
virtually every model of human cognitive mapping determines what objects 
in the environment are landmarks by perceptual saliency, a statistical con- 
struct. For a discussion of a representational theory of prototypes on which 
the prototypes used in this article are based, see Kaplan et al. (1991). 
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Prototypes and Association 
One critical property of prototypes relates to what Bruner (1957) called 
“going beyond the information given.” This refers to the fact that we do 
not necessarily have to see an entire object to activate its entire representa- 
tion. For example, seeing a large gray thing with a long trunk is probably 
enough to make one think of an elephant. This is an important property of 
object recognition: seeing pieces of an object can be sufficient to activate 
the correct representation. Furthermore, it means that activating a represen- 
tation automatically brings with it what Gibson (1979) called affordances. 
In his terms, “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the 
animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (p. 127). These 
adaptive associations are intrinsic to the network structure developed here. 
It should be noted that each representation of this system is symbol-like in 
many of its functions, it also has the capacity for activity and the capacity to 
activate other representations. For this reason the connectionist theory of 
prototypes that we will assume here has been called “active symbol theory” 
(Kaplan et al., 1990). 
Of course, not every landmark can be easily distinguished. For example, 
a particular tree might serve as a landmark. It is essential that seeing the tree 
activates the representation at the right level of the hierarchy. There must be 
something to differentiate individual trees if they are to be landmarks. 
Otherwise, a more general representation may be activated, one which could 
correspond to many different trees and therefore is not unique to any spatial 
location. Appleyard (1969), in findings later replicated and extended by 
Evans, Smith, & Pezdek (1982), found that visual distinctiveness, whether it 
was through size, shape, or a variety of other influences, is one of the criti- 
cal factors that determines whether or not a building will be recalled by 
people familiar with an area. 
The Evans et al. (1982) study went beyond Appleyard’s (1969) original 
data and looked at a variety of other factors that influenced recall. One of 
the additions that added significantly to the predictive power of Appleyard’s 
model was street context. This measured the uniqueness of a building’s 
architectural style on a particular street. For example, a modern building 
among Victorian houses would be rated high in street context and would be 
more likely to be recalled. This suggests that the overall structure of the 
environment is critical in determining what will make a good landmark 
within that environment. It may not be sufficient just to see a landmark; it 
may also be necessary for that landmark to be in the proper setting. 
Prototypes and Cognitive Maps 
The internal structure and dynamics of the representations of prototypes 
will have a significant impact upon the higher level structures in cognitive 
maps. A reasonable question to ask would be: “What is the minimum 
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amount of theory about the internal representations of objects that a model 




Landmarks must be recognizable. This in turn requires that (a) a land- 
mark must be recognizable from a variety of views and orientations, 
and (b) that in many cases only a partial view of the landmark should be 
sufficient to activate the entire representation. 
The number of landmarks which can be active, or processed, at one 
time is limited to 5 + 2, the number of objects that a person can think of 
at one time (Mandler, 1975).’ 
Landmarks are intimately linked to context. A good landmark in one 
environment may be a poor one in another environment. In addition, in 
a familiar environment the activation of a landmark might not even re- 
quire seeing it. Conversely, seeing a familiar landmark is often enough 
to call to mind its setting. 
The landmarks in the majority of computational cognitive map theories 
are based almost exclusively upon the first point. In robot implementations, 
landmarks are often simulated using simple beacons. Similarly, in computer 
simulations of cognitive maps, landmarks must generally be assumed, as 
they are in the Traveller (Leiser & Zilbershatz, 1989) and Tour (Kuipers, 
1978), because object recognition is simulated. Even the NX robot, which 
builds upon Tour (Kuipers & Byun, 1991), constructs its landmarks strictly 
on the basis of perceptual distinctiveness. Qualnav (Kuipers & Levitt, 1988) 
uses a similar rule, calling its landmarks “distinctive visual events,” and 
Mataric’s system (1990) also relies completely upon sensory characteristics. 
To some degree, perceptual distinctiveness can include context, for exam- 
ple, “the house next to gas station,” but this is quite different than high- 
level knowledge such as “the fifth traffic light,” Furthermore, Kaplan 
(1976) differentiated per~e~~u~~ distinctiveness from fu~c~~~n~~ distinc- 
tiveness. Function~ly distinctive landmarks serve some useful purpose for 
an individual and are learned primarily through frequency or repetition. 
Some systems do at least claim to take into account such issues, such as the 
Traveller, which acknowledges that a landmark can be an object that is im- 
portant “in the cognitive scheme of the user,” or in Navigator where land- 
marks are defined both by the perceptual and subjective importance 
criterion (Gopal, Klatzky, & Smith, 1989; Gopal & Smith, 1990). However, 
z In 1956 there appeared an article by George Miller entitled “The magical number seven, 
plus or minus two: Some limits in our capacity for processing information.” Due to this in- 
sightful and often cited article, it is widely believed that people can hold 7 + 2 units of infor- 
maiton in working memory. The metric Miller adopted, however, was the threshold, defined as 
the point halfway between chance and perfect performance. If one is interested in the number 
of units people can accurately hold in working memory (i.e., without error), then the correct 
value is, as Mandler (1975) pointed out, 5 *2. 
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the Traveller model lacks a theory of how this importance comes about. 
And, although Navigator has an algorithm to measure subjective impor- 
tance, it amounts to a simple count of how often the landmark is seen. 
However, even as simple an extension as counting frequencies represents an 
important step. The Navigator system uses such information at a higher 
level to simplify its scene comparison algorithms. Thus, the Navigator 
system is an example of how a theory of landmark representation can have a 
major impact upon higher level structures, something which the majority of 
cognitive mapping models cannot claim. 
The better developed the theory about landmarks, the better developed 
the overall cognitive map theory is likely to be. This is because some of the 
properties of landmarks, such as the properties listed previously can have a 
significant impact on how the cognitive structure might be organized. The 
representational theory of landmarks that is assumed in PLAN is based 
upon Hebb’s cell assembly (Hebb, 1949; Kaplan et al., 1991). Making the 
basic unit a cell assembly has a specific impact on the type of cognitive struc- 
ture that it can participate in, namely, that it will be an associative network. 
Context in such a scheme can be handled through variably weighted links 
between the landmarks which, as it will turn out, is a natural solution to the 
path selection problem. By contrast, a system with a simplier theory of land- 
marks is less constrained in the types of higher level structures that it can 
build because landmarks can be treated essentially as tokens. As we shall see, 
many of these systems do model cognitive structure in manner very similar to 
our own, but the differences, however subtle, will be important. 
Topological Routes 
In the constraint section of this article we proposed that humans actually 
develop two types of route map representations. One is essentially a topo- 
logical structure consisting of landmarks, and the other is more directional 
and codes the relative spatial relationships between landmarks. In both 
cases, at the route level, these structures will reflect a relatively direct assim- 
ilation of experience. Our research group has already proposed a model that 
encodes the topological structure of landmarks, which we review in this 
section; in the next section, we propose a new model to encode directional 
relationships. 
Topological Networks of Landmarks: NAPS 
In discussing landmarks we noted that landmarks are likely to be represented 
in an associative network. It turns out that a simple way in which to encode 
a topological system is into a network where the nodes represent landmarks, 
and directed links between them represent spatial proximity. In such a net- 
work paths could be extracted by following the links from one landmark to 
the next. The prototype representations of landmarks described in the 
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Figure 1. Traversing the paths A-6-C-D-E and W-X-C-Y-Z leads to the creation of the 
corresponding links. Because both paths intersect at C, the novel paths A-B-C-Y-Z and 
W-X-C-D-E can be extracted from the network. 
previous section serve as the natural basis for such a representation. The 
contextual links between landmarks are exactly the links that code order 
and proximity information. A system which has been built upon these prin- 
ciples is called NAPS Network Activity Passing System (NAPS; Levenick, 
1985, 1991). NAPS will serve as the basis for this portion of PLAN. What 
follows is a summary of some of the critical features of NAPS. 
NAPS works by building sequences of landmarks when traversing an en- 
vironment. NAPS is an explicitly connectionist model implemented as a net- 
work of nodes, corresponding to landmarks, and connections between 
nodes, representing the system’s ability to go between two proximate land- 
marks. In such a system all of the information is stored locally; the only 
other landmarks that are connected to a landmark are those that can be seen 
from the first landmark. To traverse between distal landmarks requires an 
intervening sequence of connected landmarks. Such a structure is adaptively 
efficient for a number of reasons. Because the information is coded locally, 
there is little possibility for error; it is only necessary to recognize the 
individual landmarks. Such a structure can also be created with little experi- 
ence, because all that is required is experiencing landmarks in sequences. 
Therefore, although such a topological encoding of the environment only 
contains a portion of the full spatial spectrum of information available, it 
does so quickly and relatively efficiently. 
Compactness is achieved in an associative network by allowing individual 
sequences to overlap (see Figure 1). The intersection of sequences within a 
stored representation represents a major step beyond mere sequence towards 
cognition (Kaplan et al., 1990). A single sequence represents little more than 
a rote, repeatable act. Intersecting sequences, however, open up the possi- 
bility for the integration of solutions in a novel fashion. A simple example 
can be seen in Figure 1 where the sequence A-B-C-D-E can be switched to 
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the novel sequence A-B-D-Y-Z after the sequence W-X-C-Y-Z is learned. 
In a cognitive map this means that one does not have to travel explicitly bet- 
ween two points to know how to get between them. It is worth noting at this 
point, that the problem of recognizing that sequences have common land- 
marks is not trivial. It requires the property that the object recognition 
system can identify landmarks from a variety of orientations, some of 
which are novel. This is one of the reasons that the type of solution to the 
landmark identification problem is so crucial to what kind of structure can 
be built at the path selection level. 
The richness of the network structure does have a cost; route extraction 
is more challenging than in systems where routes are explicitly stored. The 
network structure also opens up the possibility of confusion because of the 
number of choices available at every landmark. Selecting the proper path 
from a given starting point becomes more difficult as more and more poten- 
tial paths are added. 
Levenick’s (1991) solution to the problem is based upon a variation of 
spreading activation searches used in semantic nets and in some types of 
associative neural networks. The basis for path selection in an associative 
network consists of activating the representations for both the starting point 
and the goal location, As is generally the case in connectionist systems, 
activity is propagated from node to node where nodes in this case correspond 
to landmarks. Therefore, the activity of the start and goal landmarks will 
spread out from each other in something resembling a breadth-first search. 
Eventually the activity waves will coalesce (assuming the two points are con- 
nected by a path) at some intermediate point. This point then becomes a 
subgoal to be reached along the way. This process can be repeated using 
subgoals as start points and goals until a complete path is extracted. Con- 
ceptually, this type of selection process is equivalent to trying all possible 
paths out of the start state and all possible paths into the goal (later we will 
see that such a network is actually more sophisticated than this). When the 
two sets intersect, a candidate path has been found. 
Control ~ec~a~js~s. Levenick (1991) actually found that a strict spread- 
ing activation system is not viable because mechanisms are needed to con- 
trol activity. For example, once a subgoal has been selected and the search 
process is repeated between the start and the new subgoal, some kind of in- 
hibition is necessary to suppress the activity already existing in the network. 
A high level of performance was achieved that appears to be consistent with 
basic human cognitive mapping data by using various types of control 
mechanisms developed for systems of associative networks (O’Neill, 1990, 
1991). The modifications that are of interest in this context concern variable 
strength connections and activity control mechanisms. 
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At this point, some of the differences between a system that is built using 
connectionist principles, such as PLAN, and more traditional symbolic 
systems starts to become clearer. The use of variably weighted finks between 
nodes is an instructive example. A link between nodes represents the ability 
to get between two places. A simple representation, therefore, might have 
fixed links between two nodes in order to represent a path between the 
corresponding landmarks. However, using fixed links to connect adjacent 
landmarks yields an inadequate model of human wayfinding. Familiar 
routes are naturahy easier to remember; routes that have only been traversed 
once or twice are going to be difficuh to re-create. In terms of the learning 
rule used, this indicates that links between landmarks should have variable 
strengths. Familiar routes would be coded with high strength, whereas new 
routes would have low strengths; this is exactly what is done in PLAN. In 
terms of propagating activity during wayfinding, high-strength links will 
propagate a higher percentage of activity than low-strength links. Thus, 
nodes that are linked with high-strength links will tend to activate each 
other very quickly. One side effect of such coding is that in most cases 
familiar routes will be chosen over new ones because activity will propagate 
more quickly through the high-strength links. This is a conservative strat- 
egy, placing a high value on safety, with a strong emphasis on avoiding such 
hazardous outcomes as becoming confused or ending up in a dangerous 
place. This type of coding also results in the shortest path not necessarily 
being the path selected, because of the high premium placed upon the 
familiar. By contrast, symbolic systems with topological network struc- 
tures, such as the Traveller (Leiser & Zilbershatz, 1989) and Mataric’s 
(1990) system, spread activity in a uniform breadth-first search differen- 
tiating routes only by sequence length. 
It is also instructive to note that at this level, PLAN is automatic rather 
than deliberative: There is no controller deciding which path to extract; the 
path arises from the structure of the network. Although it is true that under 
different circumstances the associative network of fandmarks will generate 
different solutions, deliberative reasoning with such a structure requires 
higher level representations, some of which will be discussed later. 
The other major control mechanisms used by NAPS, inhibition and 
fatigue, are commonly used in connectionist systems and in application are 
not directly relevant here (for more detail, see Levenick, 1991; Kaplan et al., 
1991). The important pont is that theoretically meaningful constructs, such 
as fatigue, play fundamental and predictable roles in the management of 
activity. 
Hierarchy. Most of the control mechanisms in NAPS are designed to 
dampen activity, making more differentiation possible. One problem that 
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arises from such a design is that it is difficult to extract long paths from the 
network. The control mechanisms are designed to hold the activity in the 
network approximately constant (the variation and amount of activity is 
essentially equivalent to the activity of the 5 t- 2 landmarks that might be 
processed at any one time). The result is that, as the path between the start 
and goal states becomes longer, the average activity sustainable between 
them becomes less, eventually meaning that there are paths long enough 
such that no subgoal can be generated. 
The solution to this problem was to add hierarchical elements into the 
system. As certain paths become well learned, a higher level representation 
of them is developed. Such a structure can serve as a compact representa- 
tion of a path, which in turn could be a subpath on a longer path. There- 
fore, these structures are able to provide the support necessary for this type 
of associative network to extract long paths. 
Although this form a hierarchy gives a topological structure, the 
capability for abstracting it is different than the kind of abstraction 
necessary for an overview of an entire environment. As a connectionist 
system, processing in PLAN correesponds to activity in its elements. 
Because this activity is passed from one landmark to the next, one at a time, 
there can be no coherent “view” of a route until it has been completely 
extracted. In an overview, on the other hand, an abstraction of an entire 
environment can be processed essentially simultaneously. The type of 
abstraction in a topological associative network is basically of the form of 
compacting known information. Although useful, it is not the same as an 
overview because an overview will require the ability to combine old infor- 
mation in new ways, such as figuring out a shortcut that has never been 
taken. Also, the hierarchy is still topological in nature and therefore does 
not represent certain, potentially useful, aspects of space. 
Comparison of NAPS to Other Systems 
The defining characteristics of NAPS are that it is a topological model im- 
plemented in an associative network. Route knowledge is stored as variably 
weighted connections between landmarks. The major differences between 
this type of network and other systems that use topological information are 
where and how the knowledge is stored. 
Tour (Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers & Levitt, 1988) maintains a topological 
model of learned environments, but stores route knowledge separately, in 
production rules. Tour has been criticized for this separation (Leiser & 
Zilbershatz, 1989; Miller, 1992) on the grounds that routes are independent, 
rigid wholes, for example, Kuipers admitted that this route knowledge is in- 
sufficient to find novel routes or shortcuts (Kuipers & Levitt, 1988). 
However, Tour has the capability to deal with these shortcomings to some 
degree by the use of its stored topological information. 
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By contrast, in Traveller (Leiser & Zilbershatz, 1989), as in NAPS, there 
is no separation between the topological network and the route knowledge. 
Like Tour, Traveller uses production rules to code routes, but Traveller 
more closely resembles a pure network model because routes are sequences 
of landmarks. As sequences of landmarks are traversed, production rules 
describing how to get from one landmark to the next are added. In this way 
a network of landmarks is built up. Subroutes of one sequence can be com- 
bined with subroutes of another sequence to determine completely new 
routes. The Traveller model still suffers from computations and storage 
problems, in part because it stores more than proximal information. Any 
time a path is traversed between two landmarks, the route knowledge is 
stored even when the two landmarks are widely separated in space. 
Mataric’s (1990) Toto robot uses a representation that is the most like 
NAPS: a network of landmarks. However, like the Traveller, Toto extracts 
routes in what amounts to parallel breadth-first search. In both of these 
systems this is seen as a desirable feature because searches will always return 
the shortest paths (at least in terms of the number of landmarks traversed). 
However, as we have already argued, this is probably not a sound adaptive 
strategy. 
We have built upon the basic structure laid out in the discussion of Iand- 
marks and used it as a reasonably efficient solution for basic wayfinding 
behavior. Despite the fact that it is essentially a pure topological model (ver- 
sus some of the other systems discussed so far which incorporate other 
levels of space) and that the basic structure and learning rules of NAPS are 
fairly simple, it is capable of generating wayfinding behavior that is 
remarkably consistent with human data (O’Neill, 1990, 1991). Although its 
control mechanisms are complex, they are automatic, that is, they do not re- 
quire any cognition to activate. NAPS, as described by Levenick (1991), 
does not explicitly address all of the issues of the structure of landmarks: 
nevertheless, it meets the necessary constraints. Levenick included control 
mechanisms that limited the amount of activity in the system to a level cor- 
responding to 5&2 objects. Context is handled through the connections 
between elements. The nodes in NAPS even have a certain amount of inter- 
nal structure, controlling, for example, how long they can remain active. 
Locational Routes 
One of the limitations of a topological system is the need for directional 
search. Even though humans are particularly adept at pattern recognition, 
such a search process is inefficient, and in a dangerous situation it might 
even prove to be fatal. After traversing a route a few times, a competent 
human does not have to search for each landmark along the way; on the 
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contrary, knowing where to find landmarks becomes automatic. This im- 
plies that there is another level of space beyond, and perhaps separate from, 
the topological; we will call this level directional space. It must be pointed 
out that, unlike NAPS, most other models we discuss are not purely 
topological and do contain some notion of direction. However, the nature 
of these representations will be quite different, as we shall see. 
The requirements for directional space are simple: When at one place, it 
would be useful to “know” the direction of the next place. Given the struc- 
ture of the cognitive map developed so far, elements that are connected to 
each other are likely to be near each other. When one walks by A, one can 
next expect to see B if A and B are associatively linked. This means that it is 
not necessary to know the direction of any given landmark from any other; 
rather, it is sufficient only to know the direction of the landmarks that are 
associatively linked, and therefore close in space, to the current landmark, 
thus reducing the amount of directional knowledge necessary to a manage- 
able level. Such a system would function in a manner very similar to an asso- 
ciative structure of landmarks except that instead of coding landmarks, the 
nodes in the directional system would code relative spatial information. 
The problem faced in building a local directional representation, which 
we will call a local map, is fairly straightforward; the usefulness of a local 
map is based upon its ability to provide a relative change in orientation for 
any neighboring target landmark. Thus, when one is standing at the loca- 
tion corresponding to the local map, and when one desires to be facing a 
particular landmark, one should be able to use the local map to generate the 
relative change in orientation. Such a representation need not be exception- 
ally precise; once the orientation is fairly close to the desired value, the per- 
ceptual system can take over and use environmental feedback to increase 
precision as required. This is a major point of departure from the kind of 
directional information that is stored in most cognitive mapping systems. 
Directional information in cognitive maps is often based upon constructing 
geometric maps. Aside from the difficulty of such an undertaking (Brooks, 
198.5), such pure metric maps do not reflect the kinds of distortions that 
human cognitive maps are susceptible to (Passini, 1984). Other work, which 
acknowledges the difficulty and uncertainty involved in building a metric 
map, constructs maps that have been described as “rubber sheet” (Kuipers 
& Levitt, 1988) or “stretchy” (Brooks, 1985). We will argue that the human 
location system, which serves as the basis for how people acquire directional 
information, operates on a much more approximate level even than such 
rubber sheet maps, and that, given the powerful perceptual capabilities of 
humans, such approximations are sufficient to the task. 
Where Local Maps Occur 
It might seem reasonable to suppose that local maps are constructed at land- 
marks. After all, the topological route structure codes journeys as being 
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from landmark to landmark. In principle, this appears to be a sound idea, 
but in practice it has problems. First, one is rarely precisely at a landmark; 
rather, one is generally near them, using them as distal orienters. Landmarks 
are often large enough that being at one can mean a number of possible 
locations; a building has many sides, for example. Because local maps code 
visual information, it is the act of stopping and looking that is central to 
where they are constructed. 
Local maps are useful when a new direction needs to be selected. At such 
times a person who is traveling is likely to pause and look around. This 
pause may be associated with contemplating which way to go, or it could be 
as a result of not knowing exactly which way the next landmark lies. In 
either case, the act of looking around from a single location is exactly what 
is necessary to create a local map. Therefore, one place that local maps will 
be created will be at choice points, such as at a fork in a road or a doorway. 
Generally, any journey will consist of traveling forward until some choice 
point is reached, picking a direction, and traveling forward again, repeating 
the process until the goal is reached. The choice points are where the local 
maps are needed because that is where a new direction may be selected. 
Another place in which people are likely to pause and look around is 
when new information comes into view. When new information is afforded 
it pays, from an adaptive standpoint, to consider its consequences. In build- 
ings, these places are typically doorways or intersections of halls; outside, 
they occur where a visual narrowing is followed by a visual opening, such as 
the entrance to a cave, an opening in a forest, or a pass through mountains 
or hills. In many cases these places also happen to be choice points. 
Local Maps 
As we noted in the constraint section, for sighted humans the majority of 
spatial information comes through the where or location system. As such, 
the form of processing within the location should have a significant impact 
upon cognitive maps. One of the central hypotheses of this article is that the 
directional structures used in cognitive mapping directly reflect how infor- 
mation is processed within the location system. 
The Location System. Whereas the what or contour system is basically 
concerned with object recognition and therefore with the development of 
prototypes, the location system deals with the relationships between objects 
or, in extended space between landmarks. Because the systems have different 
functions, they use different information and different processing strategies. 
Aside from directional information, the location system is used in determin- 
ing the size of an object and its relative distance. It is also sensitive to texture 
and surfaces. It should be noted that the location and size information is 
processed in the context of an implicit picture plane (Figure 2). The picture 
plane construct reflects the fact that at any given time the visual information 
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Figure 2. The scene as picture plane. Figure 2a depicts the observer looking at a scene con- 
sisting of a tree and a house: Figure 2b the observer’s viewpoint is divided into four smaller 
regions. The objects are not detailed because of the mechanics of the location system. In 
principle, the scene could be divided into smolier regions. 
being analyzed consists of a fixed scene. By treating the scene as a two- 
dimensionai picture plane, one considers it to have the axes up-down and 
left-right. Within a scene an object’s location will have specific coordinates 
along each axis. 
Although the picture plane idea is two-dimensional, locational informa- 
tion is not restricted to two dimensions. In particular, depth information 
can be extracted through both textural and binocular cues. Nevertheless, the 
two-dimensional coordinate representation in itself is sufficient for storing 
directional information. It is not necessary to store more information because 
human perception, with environmental feedback, is fast enough to pick up 
more exact information as the system is used. Wayfinding only requires 
approximate direction. An exact direction may not be any more useful in 
any case because such a scheme relies upon being able to repeat the identical 
body and head positions. 
L~~~~io~ and the Eyes. The first step towards storing directional infor- 
mation is to determine where in the picture plane the landmarks are iocated. 
One of the primary tasks of the location system, referred to as segmentation, 
does just that. Segmenting a scene consists of dividing it into a small number 
of subregions, each corresponding roughly to an object or to an area without 
objects, that is, background. Lesperance (1990) implemented a connectionist 
segmentation algorithm that performs just such a task. Such an algorithm 
quickly yields the basic locations of objects within the picture plane. 
Extracting the necessary directional information from such a scheme is 
straightforward. A scene can be represented by a grid, which corresponds to 
the picture plane. When the scene is segmented the objects or landmarks 
found can be linked to the corresponding grid cell. Use of the structure is 
also simple; when viewing the same scene the object can activate the appro- 
priate cell through its connections and its relative location will be known 
automatically. 
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Figure 3. Each “slice” of the “pie” corresponds to o heod position. The attached grid repre- 
sents the scene that is in view with the head at that position. In this case the attached scene 
corresponds to what can be seen by looking stroight ahead. 
The link between the location system and eye movements has been sup- 
ported by researchers studying the posterior parietal area of the brain. This 
research indicates both that there are regions whose receptive fields are 
retinotopic and that their responsiveness is modulated directly by eye posi- 
tion (Andersen & Zipser, 1990; Bushnell, Goldberg, & Robinson, 1981). 
Location and the Head. Shemyakin (1962) noted that there are three 
basic tools for orientation: the eyes, the head, and the body. The grid struc- 
ture captures the method in which the eyes are useful for orientation within 
a scene. In turn, the head is useful for orienting between scenes; by turning 
one’s head from side to side, a number of distinct scenes can be viewed. A 
simple way to organize scenes within a location is by storing them according 
to the relative position of the head. For example, one scene might correspond 
to what can be seen with the head turned to the left, another with the head 
turned to the right, and a third with the head looking straight ahead. A 
structure that captures this would be pielike, with each “slice” of the pie 
corresponding to an approximate head position and the scene relevant to 
that position (see Figure 3). 
The pie is not complete because most heads have only about a 180’ range 
of motion. The enormous biases people have to 90” and 45 o angles suggest 
that the structure may be divided up into five parts; one straight ahead, two 
at 45“ angles, and two to each side. We leave the exact specifications as an 
open research question. 
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Object 
& m-----w Object 
a) current view - object is straight ahead b) stored view - object is to the right 
Figure 4. In the current view the observer is looking directly at an obiect. In the stored 
view, however, the object is directly to the right. This means that there is CI 90” discrepancy 
between the two views. To see the normalized view, the observer should turn 90° to his OF 
her right. 
Location and the Body. There is a difficulty with the head orientation 
scheme; it relies upon a fixed body orientation. The stored head positions 
are meaningless unless the current body position matches the implicit stored 
body position. For the representation to be useful, a normalized viewpoint 
is needed in order to ensure the correct body orientation. Such a viewpoint 
cannot rely on absolute directions because they are not typically known. If, 
however, one views a journey as a sequence of Iandmarks, then a solution 
arises quite naturally. The Iocation that one has just passed can play the 
necessary orientation function. Assuming that one took a relatively straight 
route to arrive at the new location, the previous location will now be directly 
behind the new field of view. This location can serve as the orienter to the 
new representation; it is the point that should be directly behind one when 
the current view corresponds to the normalized viewpoint. In the future, 
when the iocation is reached, the structure can be oriented relative to this 
spot or to other stored landmarks. In fact, any two landmarks contained in 
the representation are enough to orient it with regard to the current view 
once the structures are in place. For exampie, in coming up to the spot of 
the representation, a landmark might be sighted. This landmark will have a 
normalized orientation within the representation. This orientation can then 
be compared against the current orientation to get a relative orientation. 
For example, if the landmark sighted is straight ahead in the current view, 
but at a 45” angle in the normalized view, then the current view corresponds 
to a view with the head at a 45°C angle from the normalized view (see 
Figure 4). 
It is this combination of the grid and the pie structures oriented by the 
previous location that we are calling a local map. The name signifies that it 
is anchored at a particular spatial location and that the only stored informa- 
tion in a local map can be directly seen from that location. 
PROTOTYPES, LOCATION, AND ASSOCIATIVE NETWORKS (PLAN) 27 
Hallway 2 
Hallway 2 
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Hallway 1 
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Figure 5. Some locations potentially contain more thon one local map (L-Map). Here, of the 
junction of two hallways there ore two L-Maps, each facing down a different hallway, but 
both located at approximately the large X. 
It is tempting to create a whole circle rather than just a semicircle in order 
to capture the full range of the directional information in one structure. How- 
ever, this neither reflects the way in which people use their visual systems, 
nor is it easily constructed. There is a strong frontal bias to vision and to 
locomotion; local maps reflect those biases as evidence suggests (Shemyakin, 
1962) that they should. The local maps arise naturally from the way the 
visual system and locomotion tend to work and are sufficient in most cases 
for orientation in wayfinding. 
This does not exclude the possibility of representing the entire 360” at a 
single point; multiple local maps could be created at a single point. It does, 
however, entail a cost in switching between them. It also implies that for 
locations where there is no need for additional representations, only a single 
one will be coded. It seems likely that there would be a local map at each 
location corresponding to the various orientations one has when one arrives 
at that location along different paths (see Figure 5). 
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As was the case within the NAPS subsystem, connections within the local 
maps are not absolute, but rather reflect experience and the uncertainty 
involved in real environments. When arriving at a new location it is very dif- 
ficult to determine which landmarks are permanent and which ones are 
transient. It is, therefore, far more adaptive to connect objects to represen- 
tations with varying strengths, just as landmarks are connected together with 
varying strengths in NAPS. A stronger connection would represent a higher 
likelihood of the object being in a location, whereas a lower strength would 
represent a lesser probability. An object that is only seen once in such a 
representation would eventually lose its connection to the spatial represen- 
tation. The connections in such a scheme more accurately reflect experience 
than would fixed connections. 
Networks of Local Maps 
Local maps, like the landmarks in NAPS, serve as the basis for a route 
structure. There is no reason that the two representations should not be 
similar in structure, and indeed, our consistency principle along with the 
fact that our entire representation is connectionist both strongly suggest 
that the local maps are nodes in an associative network, which we will call 
an R-Net. There are two important implications of such a structure. 
The first has to do with the problem of knowing which local map should 
be activated at any given time. If the local maps were stored with no struc- 
ture, then activation of the correct one would require searching through all 
of them and choosing the best candidate. In an R-Net, on the other hand, 
there is no such problem. When one is at any given place and the corre- 
sponding local map is active, it automatically serves to facilitate the activa- 
tion of the local map corresponding to the next place in the journey. This, 
of course, is a central contribution of an associative network. Search (in the 
sense of searching a large database of potential local maps) is not necessary; 
the correct local map will be activated by a combination of the predictive 
facilitation of the network structure on the one hand, and environmental 
feedback on the other. Environmental feedback is necessary because one 
local map may be associatively connected to several local maps and so will 
tend to activate each of them. By providing additional support to the correct 
local map as it is reached, environmental feedback enables that local map to 
dominate the competing maps. 
The second implication was briefly discussed in the constraint section, 
namely, that there are two types of route structures available for wayfinding. 
This has several advantages. First, it provides a redundant system should 
there be a problem in the associative network of landmarks. Second, it is 
quite possible that the two systems working in conjunction with each other 
can operate faster and more efficiently, as appears to be the case with the 
two parts of the visual system (Rueckl et al., 1988). However, lacking simu- 
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lation results, this must be considered speculative. Our conjecture is that for 
most people, R-Nets eventually supplant the associate network of landmarks 
as the primary structure for use in wayfinding. There are several reasons 
why this might be true. First, R-Nets more naturally reflect the experience 
of a journey. The places coded by local maps correspond to the places that 
one actually experiences while one is rarely, truly, at a landmark. Also, 
because R-Nets are richer in spatial information, they encode more of the 
information necessary to make a journey; in particular, they code which 
direction to take. Finally, as we shall see in our discussion of survey maps, 
R-Nets serve as the basis for the survey representation in PLAN. 
Comparison of Local Maps in PLAN to Other Systems 
The idea of building metric-type information through a collection of stored 
views is not new. However, PLAN differs from previous implementations 
in what is stored, where it is stored, and the form of the storage. 
A local map in PLAN stores scenes that link objects to their approximate 
locations. Other models generally store the entire scene. Tour, for example, 
stores “views” (which actually can include other sensory data) representing 
the traveler’s sensory input at a given instant. Although Kuipers and Levitt 
(1988) claimed that these views can be abstracted and incomplete, it is not 
clear how this abstraction is achieved. There are two ways in which infor- 
mation is abstracted by local maps in PLAN. First, a scene will be divided 
into the 5 + 2 dominant objects or regions that the location system identifies; 
only these will be processed. Also, for storage purposes, the objects stored 
with a scene will be linked to the scene with variably weighted links. This 
means that only salient objects will be coded with strong links, whereas 
other objects, such as things that are only seen once, will eventually fade 
from the representation. In this way PLAN is most like Navigator (Gopal et 
al., 1989; Gopal & Smith, 1990) which has salience measures to determine 
whether or not to include landmarks in its stored scenes. 
Local maps are created in PLAN in response to basic environmental 
triggers such as at choice points or when new landmarks come into view. 
This strategy has the most in common with the Navigator system (Gopal et 
al., 1989; Gopal & Smith, 1990) and Mataric’s (1990) work on Toto. Whereas 
Toto does not explicitly store scenes, it is sensitive to those places where new 
landmarks can be sensed. Because the landmarks are stored in a topological 
network, awareness of one landmark can lead to the expectation of another. 
Navigator stores scenes at decision points. Because Navigator is used to 
model navigation within a city, these places typically occur at street inter- 
sections. Other strategies include storing scenes at regular intervals (Asada, 
Yasuhito, & Tsuji, 1988), which has obvious drawbacks in terms of storage 
costs, and storing views when they are particularly distinctive as is done in 
Tour. Such a strategy makes sense if the collection of views is unstructured 
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because it is necessary to uniqueIy identify the current view with regard to 
all possible views (Tour and NX actually create localized collections of views 
and therefore only require that a particular view be distinctive within a local 
region). However, if the scenes are stored in a network as in PLAN, then 
they not be distinct because even if two scenes contain essentially the same 
information, the appropriate local map will be activated by its connection 
to the previously active local map. Because systems like Tour do not store 
scenes in a network, the problem of matching what they are sensing to what 
is stored is significant enough that perceptual distinctiveness is perhaps the 
only reasonable strategy. The problem with a networked structure, on the 
other hand, is that is places a heavy burden upon the perceptual system to 
recognize that a new location is in fact a place where a local map has already 
been created. However, an unstructured collection of scenes essentially 
faces this problem with each location it reaches. 
Finally, local maps in PLAN rely upon body, head, and eye positions for 
orientation. Other systems such as Tour and Qualnav (Kuipers & Levitt, 
1988) attempt to fit the local views into a larger absolute space, whereas 
Navigator (Gopal et al., 1989) essentially sidesteps the issue by only working 
in city environments where turns are in 90” increments, and the streets pro- 
vide a kind of coordinate system. At the level of the local map, PLAN makes 
no attempt to fit the local information into a larger picture, except when 
distal landmarks are in view; this is left to the higher level representations 
(to be discussed in the next section). Rather than trying to resolve informa- 
tion between two or more coordinate systems, local maps are anchored by 
neighboring landmarks and contain only approximate headings. The com- 
plementary function of the perceptual system greatly reduces the precision 
required in storage and computation. in PLAN, to head off in a new direc- 
tion, the system would require a new facing (in 45” increments only), and 
within that facing, an approximate eye position. Once turned that way it 
can sight its target, get a more precise heading, and move on its way. By 
contrast, a system such as Tour would obtain a substantially more precise 
initial heading. This precision is only useful, however, if the currently cai- 
culated orientation is accurate, the stored heading is accurate, and an error- 
free turn can be executed. If there are errors, then the system will have to 
rely upon perceptual feedback to make corrections anyway. Because such 
errors are likely to occur, and because the human perceptual system is so 
powerful, there is little cost (and substantial advantage) in storing approxi- 
mate information. 
Summary 
The network of local maps both reflects and compliments the NAPS sub- 
system. The basic structure is the same in each case: an associative network 
in which the “nodes” are prototypes (see Table 1). The difference in struc- 
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TABLE 1 
Two Network Structures for Route Extraction in PLAN 







ture, and therefore in functionality, comes from what the prototypes are in 
each case. In the original associative network of landmarks the prototypes 
are objects in the world, whereas in the network of local maps the nodes 
consist of collections of scenes anchored at a specific viewpoint. Despite the 
similarity in basic structure, the character of each network is complimentary 
to the other even though each is capable of functioning independently to 
some degree. 
As discussed earlier, the associative network of landmarks is a topological 
structure. Whereas such a structure is able to capture a great deal of spatial 
information-perhaps even the bulk of the useful information-other 
spatial information, particularly directional information, cannot be easily 
represented in such a format. The human visual system provides a wealth of 
directional information, however, and the local map structures capture the 
essence of this information in a structure that is economical and effective. 
The critical concept in the development of local maps is the anchoring 
idea. There is no attempt to construct a single, objective, spatial representa- 
tion, which would require integrating information across a large number of 
scenes. Instead, individual representations are constructed at critical loca- 
tions, with the implicit assumption that these locations will tend to be visited 
on ensuing trips through the region. The end result is a structure that is rela- 
tively simple to construct and one that reflects the traveling and searching 
process rather than just being an objective structure. Such a strategy is 
common to a number of other systems (Kuipers, 1978; Leiser & Zilbershatz, 
1989; Mataric, 1990). An objective structure would have two major dis- 
advantages in this context: It would be enormously complex to construct, 
and it would have only a tenuous link to the process of moving through a 
space. 
Survey Maps 
Neither the associative network of landmarks, the local maps, or even the 
R-Nets afford the ability to apply spatial operations directly to landmarks 
separated by great distances. For example, determining the direction of a 
landmark that is even moderately far away would be extremely difficult 
using just these representations. All three structures are maximally informa- 
tive with regard to things that are close to the current location. But people 
also know about the relationships between landmarks that are not close to 
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each other. Such information can be used in spatial reasoning, such as when 
determining if there is a shorter route between two points than the standard 
path, in facilitating the search in either of the route structures, or even in 
providing the capability for hierarchical planning. 
In discussing the creation of local maps it was pointed out that some 
places in the environment are more obvious locations for local maps than 
others. This suggests that there may be places where it is natural to pause, 
look around, and reflect on one’s choices. Such reflection may allow one to 
extend the corresponding local map beyond what can be immediately seen 
by using the cognitive map’s predictive capacity, thereby building larger 
scale directional representations, which we will all regional maps. 
Gateways 
The two major qualifications for creating a local map were that a choice 
point had been reached and that new landmarks could be seen. We shall refer 
to a place that meets both of these qualifications as a gateway in honor of 
Christopher Alexander’s design construct (Alexander, Ishikawa, & Silverstein, 
1977) which is strikingly similar in description to the functioning of our own 
representation. In buildings, these are typically doorways; outside, they 
occur where a visual narrowing is followed by a visual opening, such as the 
entrance to a cave, an opening in a forest, or a pass through mountains or 
hills. Therefore, a gateway occurs where there is at least a partial visual 
separation between two neighboring areas and the gateway itself is a visual 
opening to a previously obscured area. At such a place, one has the option 
of entering the new area or staying in the previous area. 
As places that tend to separate different areas of space, gateways are a 
natural place to begin building up a higher level of directional space. The first 
level of directional space is local: A local map is defined by the area that can 
be directly seen. A gateway, on the other hand, is often an entrance to a 
larger space. Such a space can be defined as the area between gateways. For 
example, in a building one is in a particular room until one passes through a 
door to another room, or one is outside until one passes through a door 
leading inside. 
Regions 
Regions are defined by visual barriers and gateways; examples include the 
walls and doors of a building, the hills and passes between them in valleys, 
and the trees and paths into them in forests. Not only are gateways the start- 
ing points for building a spatial representation of a region, but they tend to 
be the places that are visited the most often. A building cannot be entered, 
for example, without going through the entrance. In the literature, places that 
are strongly represented and vital to the organization of regions have been 
called nodes by Lynch (1960), centroids in Traveller (Leiser & Zilbershatz, 
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1989), anchor points by Golledge (1983, and are vital for the organization 
of Yeap’s representation (1988). Of these, our representation has the most 
in common with Yeap’s. Yeap divides space up into what he called absolute 
space representations (ASRs), which correspond, in a building environment, 
to individual rooms. However, while the gateway notion emphasizes the 
importance of transitions between spaces, Yeap constructed his local represen- 
tations at the middle of each room. This was done to maximize the amount 
of information about the local environment that could be stored relative to 
a single location. Although Yeap’s work has influenced our own, the differ- 
ence in philosophies as to the locus of the critical points for storing infor- 
mation is telling. This difference ultimately leads to quite different kinds 
of systems. 
Yeap (1988), like many researchers in AI and robotics, was interested in 
optimality. In this case, Yeap would have liked to have found a point in a 
room where the entire room (if possible) could be seen. If such a point could 
be found, then it would be possible to store all of the spatial information 
associated with the room at that single location. Given this as a goal, the 
best places to use tend to be in the center of the room in question. The gate- 
way notion is built upon different principles. Among these are prediction 
and choice. Because gateways occur at transitions between spaces, they 
represent locations at which a choice will have to be made: to remain in one 
space, or to move into the next. Because gateways occur at choice points, 
they are places where people naturally pause; this pause allows scenes to be 
more carefully parsed and analyzed, and therefore makes them more likely 
to be represented and remembered. If an entire space cannot be seen from a 
gateway, then more local maps will be created as needed when traversing the 
space. Whereas such a system may not ultimately minimize the number of 
points where representations have to be created, it is nonetheless practical 
and, we would argue, more efficient because complex transformations are 
not needed. Because the structures on which PLAN is based reflect experi- 
ence so closeIy, it is a simple matter to put them to practical use. However, 
structures designed explicitly for optimality of storage or other concerns 
may not be so practical because they will sureiy require extra processing; a 
structure based upon absolute Euclidian coordinates, for example, does not 
easily lend itself to providing eye locations or simple turns of the head. 
Another difference between gateways, on the one hand, and nodes, cen- 
troids, and so on, on the other, is one of levels. Whereas gateways are rather 
low-level representations based upon visual information, the other types of 
points are higher level, playing a role akin to abstraction. A gateway, by 
contrast, is a vantage point, a concrete experienced place from which an 
array of visual information is available. One way of thinking about this dif- 
ference is that in most representations one point will stand in for an entire 
region, as in the Traveller system, whereas gateways represent transitions 
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between regions. It is a polarized or directional view of a room: a view from 
the choice point rather than an objective, optimal, already-there view. 
Therefore, it is our contention that gateways represent a different kind of 
representation; in the next subsection we will discuss a component of our 
representation that is much closer to the centroid concept. 
The gateway concept is, in our view, pivotal to the creation of regional 
structures. Not only are gateways visited more often than other places, but 
they also provide an exit point. Such an exit point is important not only as a 
potential means of escaping a dangerous situation, but in exploring a new 
place, the exit point provides a place where one can return to the old, famil- 
iar environment. 
The survey maps which we are proposing, called regional maps, have the 
same basic structure as the local maps. This has the advantage of consistency 
as well as of continuing the emphasis on vision, the primary mode of func- 
tioning for humans. There are times when distant objects can be seen in 
relationship to each other and such a view affords uniquely valuable infor- 
mation. An example of this would be when observing from a height, such as 
a hill. By looking from an oblique3 viewpoint, landmarks do not obstruct 
each other; thus their relationships to each other can be observed simultane- 
ously. Again, the gateway is an ideal location for such a viewpoint. The 
region is defined as being entirely on one side of the gateway so that the 
entire region can be “seen” from that vantage point. Of course, the scenes 
actually viewed from gateways aren’t necessarily oblique, and a major issue, 
which will be dealt with in the next subsection, is how the equivalent of an 
oblique viewpoint can be constructed. 
Regional Maps 
The R-Net structure gives rise to the development of regional maps. At any 
given time a local map will be in use. Locomoting around an environment 
will mean that local maps are activated and deactivated sequentially. As a 
familiar path is taken, each local map will begin to predictively activate 
the next local map in the sequence even before it is reached, for example, 
“around this corner I would expect to see. . . . ” As familiarity with the 
region grows, the predictions will become stronger, faster, and more accu- 
rate. In time, the predictive effects of association will begin to be taken into 
account in the current local map, particularly if one pauses, as one might, at 
a gateway. If one mentally runs through the next part of a journey, a larger 
structure containing not only the current local map, but parts of the neigh- 
’ Oblique is a term used by draftsmen and environmental designers to identify a viewing 
angle somewhere between an eye level view and a plan (or top) view. Geographers have deter- 
mined that an angle of 30” is generally preferable in presenting map information, a tradition 
that harks back to medieval times when views of a city were often drawn from the perspective 
of a person on horseback. 
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Figure 6. Figure 60 shows o person standing at o location; Figure 6b shows one “slice” of Q 
local map for the location, and Figure 6c represents a possible region01 mop at the location. 
The loco1 mop has simply been expanded. In this case the new shaded figure represents o 
house directly behind the house in 60. Its higher position in the regional map indicates that 
it is farther from the observer. Such a representation would be consistent if one were floating 
above the original viewpoint because one would then be able to see both houses directly, 
and the second house would indeed be behind the first with such a view. 
boring local maps can be created. Such a representation would contain infor- 
mation beyond that which can be seen by taking advantage of the predictive 
power of a network structure. This approach is similar in spirit, though dif- 
ferent in mechanics and result, to the way in which large-scale geometric 
representations are built in the NX robot (Kuipers & Byun, 1991). 
At this point it is important to remember that the local map concept was 
based upon the idea that what should be stored is what can be seen from a 
particular vantage point. In the regional map case, however, information is 
stored that cannot be seen from the stored viewpoint. This could potentially 
present a problem in the use of the structure. For example, if one landmark 
is directly behind another, then they would occupy the same location in the 
visual field. Thus, when the landmark that was behind is added to the grid 
representation, it would occupy exactly the same grid square and therefore 
appears to be in exactly the same location. Fortunately, there is a simple 
solution to this problem. If something farther away is thought of as being 
farther up or auf in the visual field, then more distant objects will be placed 
farther than previous objects on the periphery of the grid structure. Such 
placement represents a distortion of the true visual field at the location in 
question. However, the distortion can be resolved by considering the regional 
map to occur at a new point directly above the original point, corresponding 
to an oblique view of the mapped region. Taken further, this means that as 
the area covered by the regional map expands, the perceived height of the 
map will rise (see Figure 6). Thus, an oblique viewpoint emerges as one 
becomes more and more familiar with a large-scale space. 
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It might appear that regional maps are simply local maps that grow larger 
and larger as the environment becomes more familiar. If, however, local 
maps simply grew until they contained entire regions, they would contain an 
unmanageable number of landmarks. By contrast, if regional maps are con- 
ceptualized as abstractions of the information contained in the associative 
network of landmarks-the local maps and the R-Nets-then they should 
reduce the amount of information to its most important essence, not simply 
provide another organization of it. This loss of information does not con- 
stitute a handicap because if more information is needed it can be extracted 
from the lower level representations. 
The reduction in information comes from the context in which regional 
maps are used. Regional maps function primarily in the planning process. A 
high-level plan of a trip may consist of only a few key landmarks even when 
the journey is long. Because it is the nature of connections to reflect experi- 
ence, if certain landmarks are used repeatedly in plans then they will become 
part of the regional map. Landmarks that are rarely used will fade from the 
representation just as transient objects fade from the representation of a 
local map. The landmarks that will remain in a regional map will be those 
that are used over and over again in the context of the large-scale being rep- 
resented. It is in this context that the landmarks stored in regional maps 
function similarly to centroids, nodes, and so on, A regional map of a city, 
for example, will have only a few landmarks. High-level plans formed using 
such a map would go from one of these landmarks to the next, exactly as 
might occur with the centroids of Traveller or in the plans of the taxi drivers 
in Pailhouse’s study (1969). This strategy of solving problems by starting at 
a high level of abstraction and working towards more detailed analysis is 
found in numerous AI systems starting with GPS (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 
1960) and ABSTRIPS (Sacerdoti, 1974). 
Regional maps function within the hierarchical structure of the larger 
system. Thus, regional maps can be used to generate larger regional maps. 
The process involved would be virtually the same as in generating regional 
maps from local maps. 
Using Regional Spatial Representations 
There are two major advantages afforded by regional maps. First is the 
added ability to do hierarchical planning. Regional maps potentially can 
model just as large a space as NAPS but will contain more spatial informa- 
tion and far fewer landmarks. Even at the level of a city, a regional map will 
contain just a few landmarks. Plans formed at this level must be simple; this 
simplicity makes planning efficient and diminishes the chance for confusion. 
Each stage of the high-level plan can then be broken down into a smaller 
plan and the process repeated. Such a scheme is in accord with the well- 
known study of taxi drivers done by Pailhouse (1969). In that study, taxi 
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drivers appeared to have divided up the city into smaller regions. When 
traveling to a new region, they first went to a standard point in that region 
before proceeding to their ultimate destination. At the high level, the city 
seems to consist just of a few regions and one particular point in each region. 
However, each region in turn has a more detailed representation. Such 
a framework is also useful in dealing with breakdowns in plan execution. 
A bridge that is out will not undermine the entire plan, but only one section 
of it. 
Regional maps can also be useful in performing certain types of spatial 
reasoning. Because the spatial reIationships of distal objects can be “seen,” 
it is possible, to some degree, to determine whether a certain path is spatially 
efficient or whether it wanders too far in any direction. 
Comparison of Regional Maps to Other Representations 
Regional maps provide PLAN with the ability to make simple visual abstrac- 
tions of large-scale environments. Just as with the local maps, a significant 
feature of these abstractions is the environmental configurations that trigger 
their creation. These points, called gateways, are critical in that they deter- 
mine the boundaries of the regions and, because the abstractions are visual, 
constrain what can be “seen” in any abstraction. 
One obvious comparison is to the Traveller, which breaks down Iarge 
environments into regions, each cont~ning one centroid. These centroids 
are then used as focal points for Iong paths. Travel over long distances is 
generally viewed as from the current location to the nearest centroid, then 
to the centroid in the target region, and finally to the target location. This is 
quite similar to how pfanning would work in PLAN when using the regional 
maps, Because only a few places will be represented at this Ievel, plans will 
tend to focus upon those points. One minor difference is that regions in 
PLAN will contain more than one such point (although this may be merely 
definitional because each region could be broken down into subregions sur- 
rounding each place in a regional map). More importantly, PLAN contains 
an explicit description of the circumstances in which these places and regions 
are formed, whereas in the Traveller their creation is not well specified. 
Indeed, the optimal locations for centroids are described in terms of distance 
from other centroids rather than as being responsive to the configuration of 
the environment, 
In Tour, on the other hand, the regions are well defined. The edges defin- 
ing a region are determined by the paths that have been previously taken. 
Essentially, a path defines a boundary between things to the left of the path 
and things to the right of the path. As boundaries intersect they will begin to 
define enclosed regions. Whereas the centroid idea came from Pailhouse’s 
(1969) taxi driver study, the boundary idea is derived from work that indi- 
cates that many human cognitive maps contain “skeleton maps” of major 
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streets. In this case, the frequently traveled streets define the skeleton or 
boundary structure in Tour. Regions in PLAN do arise out of use as they do 
in Tour, but whereas the defining characteristics in Tour arises out of motion 
(traveling on a path), in PLAN it arises through stopping and looking around. 
In PLAN, and in Traveller, the abstraction at the region level was from 
place to place. In Tour, with its emphasis on paths, the abstraction is from 
path to path. So a route-finding heuristic would be specified as going from 
the current location to a well-known path, taking that path, and then going 
from the end of that path to the goal location. There is also a familiar path 
bias in PLAN. It occurs, however, not at this level, but at the level of the 
route structures where familiar routes are coded with stronger links, and 
therefore are retrieved faster and more often, and may also be directly 
abstracted. Tour, on the other hand, does not have a global overview that 
can quickly yield the relationships between distant landmarks. 
Summary 
Regional maps build upon the simple functionality of the where-to-look 
mechanisms. However, although they are structurally identical to local 
maps, they bring substantial extra power to the cognitive map. This power 
is due to the hierarchical capabilities inherent in regional maps. Regional 
maps are simple abstractions of large spaces; a regional map for a city might 
only contain five or so landmarks out of an extraordinary number of possible 
alternatives. Once again, the environment, in conjunction with the limited 
capacity of the system, has dictated the representation. It is the usefulness 
of a landmark that determines whether or not it will occur in a regional 
map, not its geometric location. The power of regional maps is a direct con- 
sequence of this simplicity. When more information is needed, one can 
always go down a level in the hierarchy. 
EVALUATING PLAN 
One of the major themes of this article is that the individual pieces of the 
cognitive map should mesh together into a smoothly functioning whole. 
Now that all of the pieces are in place, it may be helpful to go through an 
example of a possible cognitive map within a specific environment. In doing 
so we will evaluate PLAN in light of the constraints put forth earlier. Fol- 
lowing that, we will make general comparisons between PLAN and other 
models of cognitive mapping. 
An Extended Example 
For this example we will consider a hypothetical world originally presented 
by Kaplan and Kaplan (1989) called “John’s world.” John has several 
routines that play a prominent part in the development of his cognitive 
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grocery 
chu;ch 
Figure 7. A network representation of John’s world. 
He goes directly to work five mornings bad weather 
when he takes the to school even though constitutes from 
customary goes to auto 
and on Sundays goes to church. Sometimes work 
John the neighborhood tavern on home. On Fridays, John 
sometimes home from the the of auto 
save having John often goes from 
the parts the grocery when wife asks him pick up a 
loaf 
The major landmarks map correspond the common 
destinations in routine (See Figure 7). These are the places that are the 
most meaningful and John builds 
that reflect his for example, placing them in 
specific contexts with particular orientations. 
As John travels around he begins know what next during 
his This is to associative network of landmarks, has a 
kind The nodes in this network correspond the 
landmarks that John learned. Contrast the 
such a network with the total amount of information contained in John’s 
neighborhood (see Figure 8). The network structure has the additional advan- 
tage that John can such as from the 
that he never have experienced. 
Concurrent with development his associative network, although 
will be development John learns 
the environment, will come the twists and 
turns the familiar paths. When John his neighborhood, 
determining the next was a challenging task 
that he little attention left determining spatial relationships. 
ever, as John becomes more familiar with his his underlying 
associative network more efficient, freeing up capacity for the 
task the directional relationships of landmarks. this 
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Figure 8. Acrid view of John’s world 
stage, when the local maps first start to become solidly learned, that John 
can become proficient at getting around his environment; the internal man- 
agement of his associative networks is already fairly sophisticated and with 
the local maps there is a reduced need to look around to figure out where he 
is and where he is going. 
As John learns local maps, they too are structured into associative net- 
works corresponding to R-Nets. In the early stages, the function of R-Nets 
is almost purely predictive: As John leaves the location of one local map, 
the R-Net structure is useful in readying the next local map for its use. Later 
on, when the R-Net becomes well learned, it serves as a redundant system 
for wayfinding, possibly even supplanting the associative network of land- 
marks. When functioning in such a mode, John will be working in a strikingly 
similar manner to the children described by Shemyakin (1962) who drew 
their neighborhood by taking an imaginary journey. 
Increased facility with the use of the R-Nets will lead to the development 
of an environmental overview or regional map. In this case John is famiiiar 
enough with his environment to know the spatial relationships between 
landmarks even when they are visually separated. When using his regional 
map, John will have the feeling of viewing the scene as if from above, with 
the landmarks seen in oblique perspective (see Figure 9). John can then use 
this spatial information to perform efficient spatial operations. For exam- 
ple, in going from his home to the grocery store John can “see” in which 
direction it lies and that a reasonable path might be to go by way of the auto 
parts store, whereas a route that goes by way of the church would be quite 
inefficient (see Figure 10). 
When John “sees” his neighborhood he is functioning in a manner that 
appears to be in accordance with survey maps as described by Shemyakin 
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Figure 9. Perspective view of John’s world from o point above and slightly behind John’s 
house. 
(1962). However, as we noted in our description of survey maps, such a con- 
ceptualization appears to violate Piaget’s hierarchy (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1967) which specifies that survey maps are objective. Indeed, the viewpoint 
notion, which serves as the basis for regional maps, still appears to be ego- 
centric. However, the viewpoints of regional maps, being generalized, nor- 
malized, and synthetic, contain more information than a single view. The 
factors that lead to the creation of a regional map at a particular location 
are such that the resulting representation is apparently objective. Because 
the viewpoint can take in the entire region at one time and (through hier- 
archy) contains all possible objects and their relationships, the result is that 
it appears as if the viewpoint is objective and serves as an approximation 
thereof. It is also the case that because John is creating local maps (and 
regional maps) at multiple places in the environment, he can switch to the 
viewpoint most appropriate to a given task. Because he has this ability to 
use different representations of the same environment, the overall represen- 
tation is not egocentric. The combination of the particular viewpoints used 
and the number of viewpoints available makes the objective frame of refer- 
ence question moot. 
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Home 
Figure 10. One “slice” of an R-Map anchored at John’s home 
John’s cognitive map is very much in line with our criteria. Such a cog- 
nitive map representation is attractive from a variety of standpoints. Though 
the entire process of learning the map is relatively slow, it is nevertheless 
useful even at an early stage. With each development comes increased func- 
tionality, and generally, a corresponding increase in the speed at which the 
map can be used. However, whereas most of the mechanisms are consistent 
from structure to structure, the individual pieces rely very little upon each 
other. Economy is emphasized through the development of the map; things 
are only added as they prove useful, and the structure that is stored is of low 
precision, with the resulting benefit that complexity is greatly reduced. As 
we have noted throughout, the basis for the directional structures in PLAN 
comes from research on the two visual systems in humans. It is because of 
this work that some of the minor differences between PLAN and develop- 
mental theories have arisen. In particular, we are proposing that there are 
two types of route structures rather than one, and that the structures which 
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are called maps are not but to be. 
are proposing the developmental is 
in light of the 
to prototypes. 
Models of Cognitive Mapping 
The models that we are comparing with PLAN are summarized in Table 2. 
Of these models, Qualnav (Kuipers & Levitt, 1988) and Mataric’s (1990) 
model do not claim to be models of human cognitive mapping although 
they appear to derive a certain amount of their theory from such work. 
Most of these systems have commonalities with PLAN, and all of them have 
some type of topological structure. PLAN differs from all of these systems 
in that it is connectionist and builds global overviews of the environment. 
At the landmark level, the Navigator (Gopal et al., 1989) system probably 
comes the closest to having a theoretical treatment as extensive as PLAN’s. 
Other systems such as Tour (Kuipers, 1978), Qualnav (Kuipers & Levitt, 
1988), and Mataric’s (1990) decide that an object is a landmark based purely 
upon sensory distinctiveness. Both PLAN and Navigator acknowledge that 
this is the critical issue in landmark formation, but both also acknowledge 
that issues such as importance can play a significant role (the Traveller model 
does as well, but does not have an explicit theory as to how such factors 
work). Typically, this importance would reflect how often a place is used, 
for example. PLAN goes beyond even Navigator both by addressing issues 
such as context and how landmarks might be processed, and by putting 
landmarks within the framework of categorization. 
The next stage in cognitive map development is the route map level. At 
this level we have proposed that there are actually two types of route extrac- 
tion mechanisms. The first is based upon a topological network of landmarks 
and could be called the traditional route extraction method. Such a method 
is used by Mataric’s (1990) system and Traveller (Leiser & Zilbershatz, 
1989) as well as PLAN. Such a method of wayfinding is natural because 
landmarks are what people learn first in new environments. However, such 
a structure does not accurately reflect a typical journey because travel does 
not naturally occur as landmark to landmark; one is often near landmarks, 
but not usually at them. The second type of route map is based upon net- 
works of places, where places correspond to the locations that one would 
actually pass through in a journey. Examples of such places include decision 
points in Navigator (Gopal et al., 1989), enclosed regions in Yeap’s (1988) 
system, and gateways (Alexander et al., 1977), which may be decision points 
or places where new landmarks can be seen, in PLAN. The network of places 
can take advantage of those distinctive locations that occur in wayfinding 
and use them for a mode of route storage that more naturally reflects the 
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points of Navigator because they encompass places where one is likely to 
pause, and more specific than Yeap’s regions, which can cover a fairly sig- 
nificant area. Only Tour (Kuipers, 1978) and PLAN have the capability for 
both types of route extraction. Tour can extract routes through a topological 
network just as PLAN can, and Tour’s basic route structure is based upon 
capturing the structure of a journey just as in PLAN. However, while PLAN 
schematizes journeys into networks of places, Tour stores rules about getting 
from place to place. The result is that paths are generally treated as insepar- 
able wholes in Tour; the places along the way are not significant beyond 
being a part of a path. Tour does have, however, the capability to combine 
pieces of different paths when necessary. PLAN, by contrast, retains the 
distinctness of the landmark representations that define the paths, permitting 
intersecting paths and, ultimately, the formation of a flexible network struc- 
ture. Another difference between the two systems is that Tour does not 
make the developmental distinctions that PLAN does, simply positing that 
the path structure will generally be used and the topological network will be 
used when there is no known path. 
A survey map is a compact representation of a large-scale environment. 
The survey maps of PLAN, called R-Maps, are visual in nature and corre- 
spond to what one might see if one were looking out at the environment 
from above. However, the survey maps of PLAN are still compact because 
they contain only a fraction of the possible information that could be 
stored. This schematized global overview is unique in the cognitive mapping 
literature. Navigator, Tour, and Qualnav store views, but do not abstract 
them beyond the local level. Traveller does have a compact large-scale rep- 
resentation of a sort, but it could not be called an overview, and Traveller 
lacks a theory as to how these points are developed. Both Yeap and Tour do 
have explicit theories about regions, but neither has a theory for developing 
them into an abstract hierarchy. The structure of R-Maps lends itself to 
making predictions about human functioning. First, because the R-Maps 
correspond to particular locations with particular orientations, which we 
call gateways, it should be the case that there are views of familiar environ- 
ments that people prefer. For example, someone who lives on the north side 
of a city might prefer a map which has south as up rather than north. 
Porteous (1971) showed that this is the case and that people can in fact be 
confused by a map with north as up. More recently, Warren and Scott (1993) 
showed that people prefer to align maps with the environment it represents 
and that their performance on wayfinding tasks is better when such align- 
ment is done. Another prediction, for which we only have anecdotal evi- 
dence to support, would be that a map which is anchored at such a point 
and provides an oblique perspective should be preferred over a standard 
cartographic map with a plan or overhead view. 
A final point of comparison between PLAN and these other systems could 
be labeled as the style of the representation. The representations of PLAN 
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tend to be schematic: Less is stored rather than more. The problem with 
such an approach is that is relies upon being able to differentiate between 
what is important and what is not. Traditionally, what has been important 
in cognitive mapping has been landmarks: Landmarks are the most obvious 
salient features of the environment. One of the advances of cognitive map 
theory has been the identification of what else in the environment is impor- 
tant. Lynch (1960), for example, identified junctions, where paths come 
together, as being important places. Navigator, among other systems, ex- 
tended this idea by identifying decision points as being particularly salient. 
The Traveller system takes this notion even further by defining a kind of 
super junction, called a centroid, which is a location of special importance. 
PLAN attempts to provide a framework to explain what it is that makes 
these and other locations so important. One such issue is the structure of the 
environment. Some places are important because they open up a new vista 
of information. Another issue is usage. Some places are important because 
they are visited time and time again. As in the Navigator system, some places 
are important because they are at decision points. PLAN also takes these 
concepts a step further by defining a gateway to be a place that represents 
the integration of all three of these factors. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the fundamental ideas that differentiates PLAN from other cognitive 
mapping systems is that it is a “heads-up” or scene-based representation. 
The stored views in PLAN are not from an aerial perspective as in a typical 
map, but reflect what an observer sees through different head positions at a 
single location. In this, as in other matters, one of the key tenets of PLAN is 
that storage reff ects experience. Whereas an overhead representation might 
cover an entire area, it may be necessary for multiple scenes to provide full 
coverage of an environment in PLAN. However, these scenes will correspond 
to locations that one is likely to be in. Furthermore, it turns out to be a rela- 
tively simple matter to extract usefut in~?rmation from the stored scene and 
to use it directly. For example, in PLAN one can easily extract head and eye 
locations for the positions of neighboring landmarks. By constructing a 
~‘semantically transparent” representation, the job of putting the represen- 
tation to use is considerably simpler (Clark, 1989; Smolensky, 1988). In an 
overhead representation one must translate from the current perspective to 
the overhead perspective and back, a potentially confusing and complex 
task. Although PLAN is not the only scene-based system fsee, e.g., Gripers 
& Levitt, 1988 Tour & Qualnav], the scene information stored in PLAN is 
schematic; the perceptual system is fast enough and flexible enough to take 
an approximate direction and convert it to an exact location. 
Central to the success of the heads-up perspective is the idea that certain 
locations in the environment are particularly important because they are 
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visited frequently. In PLAN, these locations are called gateways. Again, the 
gateway notion comes about from taking an adaptive approach to building 
structure. Gateways are natural places for building scene-based representa- 
tions because it is at these locations that a new vista of visual information is 
available. Organisms also need to know about gateways because they repre- 
sent choice points and escape opportunities. Finally, gateways are important 
simply because they are visited so often: It is not possible to enter a new 
space without passing through a gateway of some type. 
Many buildings intrinsically incorporate the principles of gateways into 
their design. Maps of the building are usually located right next to the en- 
trances. Additional floor maps might be included next to the elevators on 
each floor, and pointers to rooms are often put up at hallway intersections. 
All of these locations are gateways because they all occur at places where 
new visual information becomes available, from the whole new scene when 
stepping out of an elevator, to the view down intersecting corridors. Such a 
mapping scheme is so natural in the context of buildings that it is hard to 
imagine any alternatives. The building environment is such that all places 
are not created equal; places such as doorways and the intersection of corri- 
dors are especially important because they represent decision points. We 
argue that the same can be said for the outdoor environment with cave 
mouths, mountain passes, entrances to forests, rivers, and so on. This is 
another difference between PLAN and other cognitive mapping schemes: 
The structure of the environment plays a particular and central role in the 
construction of the representation at multiple levels. Although environmental 
distinctiveness is an important part of most cognitive mapping systems in 
terms of landmark recognition, at higher levels the environmental relation- 
ship tends to become fuzzier. Traveller, for example, has a region structure, 
but no natural method for determining regional boundaries. Tour, on the 
other hand, uses paths as boundaries. PLAN is the only system in which the 
regional structure is an analog of the physical and visual structure of the 
environment. 
PLAN synthesizes elements of Gibson’s (1979) perceptual theories with 
an internal representation concept. Gibson contended that humans do not 
have such internal representations, that it is not necessary to store everything 
that is in the environment because the environment itself will provide much 
of the information that one needs. A modern version of this idea, though 
not specifically intended as a model of human cognition, can be found in 
“behavior-based” models (for reviews, see Brooks, 1991; Maes, 1993). For 
example, it is not necessary to store every feature of a tree because when the 
tree is next seen all of its features will be available; it is only critical to tune 
the system to respond uniquely to the tree. This could be called an environ- 
mentally centered approach because it builds on the idea that the environ- 
ment is rich enough to provide all needed information, and furthermore, 
the internal representations are extremely sensitive to the environment. A 
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more traditional information-processing view, on the other hand, is the 
knowledge-based approach. The goal of many such systems is to capture as 
much knowledge about the task domain as possible. Although this approach, 
when applied to cognitive mapping, does store environmental information, 
it does not necessarily do so in a transparent fashion. Once an environment 
has been learned, all planning and reasoning can be done completely inter- 
nally and exhaustively. By contrast, a system like PLAN only stores a frac- 
tion of the available information internally and relies upon the perceptual 
system to fill in gaps when plans are put into action. An information intensive 
approach is perhaps sensible for robots with limited perceptual skills, and 
for computer simulations where there is no real environment. Humans, 
however, bring an impressive array of perceptual skills to bear in environ- 
ments that are too complex to learn completely and that also change fre- 
quently. It should be noted that this distinction is not necessarily directed at 
other models of cognitive mapping, most of which recognize that human 
cognitive maps are inherently sketchy, but instead is intended as a general 
comment on representational strategy. A Gibsonian/knowledge-based/ 
connectionist synthesis recognizes the value of the environment and the 
information it affords as well as the usefulness of having a model of it. 
Relying on the environment to a certain extent, for example, in depending 
on natural gateways and allowing the perceptual system to provide any 
needed precision, allows for a more economic system than is possible using 
a knowledge-based approach. 
Much of what is unique about PLAN with regard to the cognitive map- 
ping literature is not new with regard to cognitive science. The treatment of 
landmarks, for example, is based heavily upon prototype theory. The scene- 
based portion of PLAN has arisen out of work on the human visual system, 
particularly the location system. The high-level abstractions in PLAN are 
not only built on the lower level scenes, but draw upon the descriptions of 
such abstractions in the developmental literature. Nevertheless, although 
many of the pieces are not new, PLAN represents a new approach to cogni- 
tive mapping: an approach that is sensitive both to the ways in which humans 
process information and to the environment, the source of that information. 
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